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T H E H I S TO R I O G R A P H Y O F W Y C L I F ' S DOMINIUM T H O U G H T
In 1377, John Wyclif had need of powerful political support. He had been summoned to Saint Paul's by Archbishop Sudbury to account for heretical arguments threatening to the foundations of the church in England. So on February 19, Wyclif appeared at the arraignment with John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster and arguably the most powerful man in the kingdom. Wyclif, once an Oxford metaphysician, had become an associate of John of Gaunt two years earlier, and had begun arguing for the reduction of the church's political influence and her material wealth shortly thereafter. Gaunt was, and still is, widely believed to be eager to supplement his political power at the expense of the church, and Thomas Walsingham encourages us to believe that Gaunt's support of Wyclif that February afternoon was that of a patron for his valued servant.
1
Had Gaunt been self-interestedly using Wyclif as his polemicist, he had made an odd choice. Wyclif's arguments for the absolute power of the king were framed neither in the theocratic kingship language of the AngloSaxon and Anglo-Norman tradition, nor were they couched in the more contemporary Aristotelian terms favored by other champions of secular authority.
2 On the contrary, Wyclif used language that had, until then, usually been employed by papally sponsored churchmen. His arguments were framed in terms of Grace-founded dominium, redolent of Archbishop Richard Fitzralph's defense of ecclesiastical property-ownership.
3 Talk of Grace as the true source of earthly justice was part of an established Augustinian tradition in England that had its immediate foundation in the papal hierocratic thought of Giles of Rome.
4 While Wyclif's clerical opponents might have labored to refute Aristotelian arguments similar to those of John of Paris or Marsilius of Padua, dealing with terms that most English churchmen held dear to their hearts would not be difficult. Wyclif made it easier by using dominium to refer both to proprietas, which had been its chief reference in Fitzralph's thought, as well as to iurisdictio, which canonists had long since ceased to see as necessarily dominative.
Joseph Dahmus effectively argues that Gaunt was doing nothing more than providing support for a loyal servant of the Crown, suggesting that contemporary chroniclers' and more recent scholars' antipathy for Gaunt motivates the popular impression that Wyclif constructed his arguments on the duke's behalf.
5 What remains unresolved is why Oxford's most eminent philosopher would suddenly turn away from metaphysics and risk all by putting forth dangerous, possibly heretical, arguments about the present state of the church. Recent scholarship has suggested that Wyclif's motives were political, or that they were theologically founded, as was the Mertonian Bradwardine's anti-Pelagian De Causa Dei a generation earlier.
6 Wyclif 's own account is not terribly helpful, for his only explicit reference to the shift of his attention is to note that he felt it was time to introduce practically applicable issues to his theoretical pursuits.
7
One way to understand Wyclif's interest in practical matters is to discover why dominium had captured his attention, for he makes occasional reference to it in his Tractatus de Universalibus, the last of his expressly metaphysical treatises. Why Wyclif used dominium as the concept central to his political writing has not been addressed. Given the English Augustinian tradition's century-old association with Grace-founded dominium, it is sensible to wonder what prompted Wyclif to appropriate it for his own, apparently unorthodox, purposes. If there were significant grounds for Wyclif's use of the concept in his earlier, more traditionally scholastic thought, we might be able to understand better the place of dominium in his political thought.
If the goal is to see why Wyclif appropriated Grace-founded dominium as the concept to wield in his political writings, it is tempting to suppose 4 A. Gwynn that his aim was to hoist the papacy and its supporters with their own petard. But this raises more problems than it answers, for it suggests that Wyclif, a priest and theologian, would subvert his theology by using it for mundane ends, namely the glorification of secular power. This casts a doubtful aura on all of his later works, which were devoted to expressly theological issues. Secondly, this answer avoids the difficulty of the question of how dominium can involve both proprietas and iurisdictio by explaining it all as so much cynical political maneuvering. To understand why Wyclif characterized his union of theological and political thought in terms of a dominium that combined both proprietas and iurisdictio, we must do several things. First, we should ask whether other philosophers before him had done this. We have already mentioned that Fitzralph framed his thought in these terms; tracing the development of the tendency to frame political discourse in this specific theological language will better prepare us to argue that Wyclif was doing more than trying to make a name for himself among monarchists. Second, we should look carefully at the substance and argument of both De Dominio Divino and De Civili Dominio. What aspects of each of these works unite the two, and what aspects refer back to his metaphysics? Can we use Wyclif's metaphysical and theological language to explain his political thought as a coherent realization of his philosophical program?
Wyclif was a confirmed realist about universals, believing that individual created beings have their reality by virtue of the prior being of universals. He wrote the dominium treatises shortly after having finished writing Tractatus de Universalibus, his clearest explanation of the reality of universals. Are there sufficient grounds for holding that he believed the divine dominium relation functions as a universal, from which individual instances of just human dominium derive their reality? If sufficient grounds for this argument exist, it is reasonable to suppose that Wyclif would have been aware of the possibility of his educated readers recognizing this structure, and understanding the argument of De Civili Dominio as a practical articulation of his realism. This would mean that his radical conclusions, including the need for a strong, Grace-favored civil lord or king to reduce the office-holders of the church to Christ-like poverty, were evident as wholly consistent with a realism evocative of Augustine's own thought.
To show this, we must look at dominium as Wyclif does, as the relation between Creator and Creation most expressive of the on-going governance and maintenance God provides for his creatures. We will examine the definition of dominium Wyclif provides in De Dominio Divino as founded in his metaphysics, and as it plays out in his thought on how men ought to live together. Next, we shall look at the dominium described in De Civili Dominio as a concept entailing both private ownership and political jurisdiction. If these two issues are explicable as articulations of Wyclif's realism by contributing to the conception of dominium as a clear causal connection between divine and just human dominium, it is difficult to avoid concluding that his conception of just human dominium is related to God's dominium as is a particular to a universal. This will show how unfounded are the charges that Wyclif 's political writings are philosophically unrelated to his metaphysics, that they are monarchist apologetics, motivated primarily by events that occurred in his life. It will also provide a framework with which to approach the texts themselves. Philosophers will be able to understand how the last of the great English schoolmen viewed the relation of theoria to praxis, and will have the opportunity to see how holding a unique metaphysical realism about universals can lead to social conclusions not usually associated with metaphysics. Medievalists of all stripes will thus be able to understand the intellectual tenor of Oxford's last great light of the age, and they will be free to interpret Lollardy and the Hussite movement in the terms set and defined by the two movements' progenitor.
Some efforts to explain Wyclif's thought on dominium as it is expressed in De Dominio Divino and De Civili Dominio have been colored by desires to have it cohere with his later, more explicitly polemical writing. Rather than study these works to see how they fit in the body of Wyclif's work, this study will examine them for their philosophical content and reliance on his earlier metaphysics. While it will show that these two works are founded in Wyclif's realism as it appears in the Tractatus de Universalibus, this study is not meant to suggest that the dominium treatises make up a part of the broader, theological program established in the Summa Theologie.
Peter Brown has suggested, regarding Augustine's thought on religious coercion, that we cease looking for one set doctrine, and instead be open to the shifts and developments in positions characteristic of an active thinker.
9 This might prove a more useful way of handling Wyclif's thought on dominium with regard to the bulk of his writings, for it figures as something more than what we now consider to be political theory, while more practically orientated than straight theology. This chapter will serve as an overture in which we briefly survey the scholarship relating to Wyclif's political thought, beginning with analysis of the scholars responsible for introducing him to twentieth-century eyes. As the study of the history of medieval philosophy has grown more philosophically sophisticated, some thinkers like Wyclif have received less attention than the complexity and theological innovation of their work deserve. The reasons for this vary, ranging from a vested institutional interest in more theologically orthodox thinkers to the relative absence of edited versions of later fourteenth-century philosophical texts. Most twentieth-century scholars of Wyclif 's thought have concluded that his metaphysics has no bearing on his dominium treatises. It will be best if we lay out their conclusions and their reasoning, not only to give us a starting point for our own discussion, but also to show how contemporary historians of thought have approached Wyclif 's philosophy.
Following this introduction, we will assess the influence of several figures whose ideas were influential on Wyclif 's realism, or on his political thought, or on both, including Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Archbishop Richard Fitzralph. This discussion will outline Wyclif 's place in the philosophical dialogue, and provide a perspective from which to understand specific aspects of Wyclif 's theory. In the third chapter we will recount the argument of De Dominio Divino, both as a carefully articulated piece of philosophy in its own right, as it is related to the earlier philosophically to his dominium thought is also important, for at least one scholar has argued that Wyclif 's political agenda is unrealizable because of it. 10 Accordingly, we will examine both the foundation of Wyclif 's determinism and its implications for his thought on dominium. Finally, we will look at other treatises of Wyclif 's Summa Theologie contemporary with the two dominium treatises, notably De Statu Innocencie and De Mandatis Divinis, insofar as they are useful in helping us to unravel the arguments of the two principal works in question.
At this point, we will be set to explore Wyclif 's thought regarding just human dominium as expressed in De Civili Dominio and also in the related work De Officio Regis. We will look first, in a fourth chapter, at what Wyclif says about the institution of private ownership in postlapsarian society, for this topic directs his thought on kingship as such. Wyclif devotes half of De Civili Dominio to explaining his thought about the evils of private ownership for members of Christ's body on earth, and the other half to explaining why it is important that just civil lords, owners of large amounts of property, should be Grace-favored, and how they should relieve the church of its material burdens. Wyclif believes Grace should function as a precondition of just private ownership, and that private ownership is a sin-stained perversion of the communal state of Eden, and resolving this apparent contradiction is necessary to a complete understanding of his thought on dominium. Further, Wyclif 's concept of private ownership has direct bearing on our understanding of his later works, most importantly De Ecclesia, which was to be particularly influential in the Hussite movement.
This done, we will be ready to analyze in a fifth chapter Wyclif 's picture of the duties and nature of civil dominium, which is functionally equivalent to kingship. His description of a monarch who must serve and protect his realm as well as the church therein has all the trappings of monarchic absolutism. But Wyclif 's picture of kingship has Christian caritas as its chief characteristic; we will see how this is related to his thought on Grace as a precondition for just civil dominium. Consequently, it will be evident that this conception of the lord-subject relation is indicative of his view of the way that just human dominium functions as an instantiation of divine dominium. Thus, we will have discussed civil dominium in terms of proprietas and iurisdictio, and we will see how Wyclif believed these two concepts to be necessarily connected.
In a final chapter we will be set to conclude by showing how Wyclif 's joint conception of private ownership and political power in just civil dominium depends upon his thought on divine dominium, which, in turn, is explicable only in terms of his metaphysical realism. This will allow us to characterize the status of divine dominium as being a universal in which all instances of just human dominium participate as instantiations in terms fully compatible with Wyclif 's definitions. Many students of England in the later Middle Ages have had to come to grips with the phenomenon of Lollardy. A careful examination of Wyclif 's dominium treatises will allow us to make some headway in two important aspects of the study of this unique heresy. First, we shall be able to analyze the validity of the following hypothetical syllogism: (a) If one adheres to a Wycliffite realist metaphysics, one can coherently adhere to the social/political conclusions of the dominium treatises. (b) If one coherently adheres to the social/political conclusions of the dominium treatises, one can consistently embrace the political notions of early Lollardy. Therefore, if one adheres to a Wycliffite realist metaphysics, one can coherently embrace the political notions of early Lollardy.
This does not mean that all Lollards were metaphysical realists, nor that all Lollards had read the dominium treatises. But it does point to a potential causal relationship between metaphysics and a praxis-oriented movement that would imply that modern scholars have been premature in their assessments of the relevance of Wyclif 's metaphysics to his later thought.
m e d i eval p ol i t i cal th e ory 's re lat i on to sc h olast i c m etaphys i c s An important element in the scholarship concerning medieval political thought has been the understanding of its relation to medieval metaphysics. Martin Grabmann's 1934 characterization of the relation of a philosopher's respective Augustinianism or Aristotelianism to his respective papalism or monarchism served as a landmark in this study.
11
He argued that political philosophers who advocated the supremacy of faith tended towards papalism, and those who desired to strike a balance between faith and reason generally favored a Thomistic Aristotelian compromise between monarchy and papacy, while those who saw reason as autonomous supported a lay monarchy founded on the consent of the governed. Grabmann divided philosophers who wrote on recognizably political issues into Augustinian hierocratic theorists, Thomistic Aristotelians, and Averroist Aristotelians. In the first group he includes Guido Vernani, Ptolemy of Lucca, Augustinus Triumphus, Giles of Rome, and James of Viterbo.
12 In the next, he includes Aquinas and John of Paris.
13 And in the group advocating reason's autonomy he includes Marsilius of Padua and William Ockham.
14 It is not hard to see a certain tendency: the Aristotelians tend towards monarchism, while the Augustinians tend towards papalism.
The most fully developed response to Grabmann's approach appeared in Alan Gewirth's "Philosophy and Political Thought in the Fourteenth Century."
15 He argues that it is simplistic to line up realists with extreme papal sovereignty and hierocratic theory, and nominalists with monarchism, and moderate realists with a "two spheres" argument.
16 Gewirth agrees that Wyclif belongs in the Augustinian political tradition, and recognizes his reliance on Giles' hierocratic thinking, but points out that Wyclif 's conclusions are an equally Augustinian species of anti-hierocratic reasoning. Gewirth is not arguing that no connection exists between philosophy and practical politics, only that agreement in practical politics does not necessarily entail a correlative agreement in metaphysics. He suggests that Wyclif and Marsilius of Padua, though certainly in agreement regarding several desired political outcomes, can by no means be said to share the same values.
17 Gewirth argues that historical conditions warrant careful consideration in any attempt to relate philosophical doctrine with political program, and that one cannot suppose either metaphysics or political theory to be so open to correlativity as to allow adherence to one sort of belief to dictate adherence to another. In some thinkers, theoretical and practical philosophy were arguably correlative, while in others such an argument is bound to involve stretching the truth to the breaking point. It is best, Gewirth suggests, to take it on a case-by-case basis.
Michael Wilks' The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages effectively supports Grabmann's thesis that a tendency towards metaphysical realism was directly proportional to a tendency towards the papal hierocratic position. 18 Wilks suggests that Grabmann's approach is useful in illustrating how medieval positions on universals had real political implications, leading one to recognize the social import of the scholastic metaphysical disputes. Adherence to realism means recognizing that the 12 Ibid., pp. 61-129. 13 Ibid., pp. 20 Wilks believed that one could, and set about addressing this problem. In so doing he set the tone for further discussion of the relation of Wyclif 's Oxford metaphysics of the Summa de Ente to the political and reformist thought of the Summa Theologie.
Charles Zuckerman rightly points out that regarding the church as a universal of some sort is not commensurate with the medieval view of the church's nature. 21 Zuckerman suggests that Wilks' intuition, based on Grabmann and Otto von Gierke, is not wholly ill-founded; many of the important positions regarding the place of the church in the world were formulated by philosophers who had well-developed metaphysical standpoints, and it would be natural to look for some sort of connection. Better, though, to look to other possible explanations for the political opinions of these philosophers, for it is as likely that they formulated their ecclesiological thought for political reasons as for ontological ones.
22
Wyclif 's case will allow for at least one instance of such a connection, but the universal in question is not the church, but divine dominium itself.
23
a c e ntury of w yc l i f sc h olar sh i p An outline of the chronology of Wyclif 's Latin works will be useful in gaining fuller appreciation of the assessments of Wyclif scholars of the relations between the treatises. We are aware of ten expressly philosophical treatises that Wyclif wrote between 1360 and 1372, including three logical works ( Robson's assessment is that Wyclif 's metaphysics indicate "a cautious and conservative Oxford don," someone more interested in affirming orthodoxy than in reforming it. Robson notes that his desire to gain an overview of Wyclif 's metaphysics has caused him to stop just short of the really interesting part of Wyclif 's thought, namely the "interweaving of Wyclif 's polemics with his scholasticism . . . the fascinating psychology of the don in politics . . . "
35 He steadfastly avoids discussing the teachings of the Summa Theologie, and leaves the reader with the sense that so fully developed a philosophical mind as Wyclif 's was sure to bring into its consideration of extra-metaphysical matters its rigorous approach, if nothing else.
Michael Wilks' study of John Wyclif 's political thought is the only instance of an analysis that is careful to include as much of Wyclif 's thought as possible while interpreting the political theory as a serious enterprise. Two main directions in which Wilks has developed his analysis deserve our attention, namely, his argument that Wyclif 's political thought is in fact a valid pro-monarchic position, and his assessment of the relation of Wyclif 's earlier metaphysics to that political stance. Wilks tradition, further emphasizing Wyclif 's dedication to social reform as a product of his broader theological and philosophical system.
37
What are we to make of a social theory that "seems to be justifying something not far short of anarchy?"
38 Wyclif has been accused of providing an unoriginal rehash of the established principle that divine iustitia should be behind all human rule. 39 He has also been accused of being unclear about how to distinguish between the Grace-favored Elect and the Damned, and of having devised his thesis in order to support the expropriation of the clergy by the laity, just as Fitzralph had used it against the Friars Minor, with neither author having shown how a connection was to be made between the righteous and the expropriators. 40 These are practical questions about the applicability of Wyclif 's thought that certainly needed to be addressed, and Wilks effectively addressed them by showing that Wyclif 's critics underestimate his shrewdness and perspicacity. He argued that Wyclif was not really concerned with distinguishing between the Elect and the Damned, that he was content to leave such distinctions to God. He attributed to Wyclif the position that "human life secundum praesentem iustitiam bore little relationship to the realities of the divine world; that there were two levels of truth, human and divine, coexistent but contradictory; that, in effect, human life could be considered with but small reference to God."
41 While Augustinian in its approach, this implies that God participates minimally in the ongoing drama of secular political life. Wilks downplayed the import of Wyclif 's thought on ownership, arguing that his condemnation of ecclesiastical private ownership is really a de facto endorsement of the superior public right of the king's power as both prince and priest. 41 Wilks, "Predestination, Property and Power," p. 229. "The result was to leave man -at least within the limits of this mortal life -as the virtual master of his own world." 42 Ibid., pp. 234-5. "What he [Wyclif] deplored was the notion that private property rights were immutable -that there was a perpetual civile dominium inherent in ecclesiastical tenure -which would effectively deny the superior public right -the divine lordship -of the king's grace . . . the very familiar features of an ecclesiastical polity over which the prince stands supreme as king and priest." theological justifications for his condemnation of the institution of private ownership as a smoke-screen enabling him to resurrect the old model of a theocratic monarchy, or, Wilks suspects, to presage a Tudor-style absolutism.
43
The fullest of Wilks' explications of the mechanics of Wyclif 's civil dominium theory is his 1972 discussion of Wyclif as proto-reformer.
44 This is also the most radical of Wilks' interpretations of Wyclif as the advocate of a Tudor-like reform of the English church. Here Wilks emphasizes the differences between Wyclif 's recognizably Augustinian attitudes towards obviously theological issues, and his less recognizably Augustinian and more Aristotelian endorsement of the civil lord's holding of absolute temporal power over all subjects, ecclesiastical and secular. 45 Wilks argues that the reform that Wyclif calls for is largely a political reorganization of power, with doctrinal reform being little more than an after-effect of the king's actions. In this argument, Wyclif 's ecclesiology serves as a means to political ends, in which the king is regarded as final temporal authority in all venues, sacred and secular. 46 Seen in this light, Wyclif is less a political philosopher than a revolutionary, heralding a top-down revolution to be undertaken by a junta of theologians who enjoy the complete trust of the civil lord.
47
In 1969 Wilks addressed the possibility that Wyclif had formulated definite political ideas while still at Oxford, in the early 1370s. Following Grabmann's dictum that papalists are realists while monarchists are nominalists, Wilks argued that Wyclif had renounced the ontological realism of the Summa de Ente by the time he had come to write the dominium treatises. He begins his arguments referring to those occasional passages in Wyclif 's later works wherein he laments his earlier, youthful digressions; in the past scholars have taken this to imply that Wyclif had earlier been swayed by Ockhamist metaphysics. 48 Indeed, Wyclif admits to having been mistaken about universals, 49 hylomorphism, theory of time, 50 and predestination, 51 among other topics. 52 Wilks suggests that Wyclif 's errors in his youth were not metaphysical ones in the Ockhamist camp, but those of excessive realism about universals, and that as he abandoned his ill-fitting realism, he also abandoned his hierarchic papalism. After all, Wyclif reports himself as being, in his early days, an advocate of a hard-line interpretation of God's omnipotence, which is consonant with the papal hierocratic argument of papal sovereignty. Is it but coincidental that, as Wyclif embraced a more royalist program, he veered away from the idea that God's will directs all human and, indeed, all created action? This is consonant with Wilks' argument regarding God's relative non-interference in secular politics, suggesting a tendency to view Wyclif 's theological justifications for the king having absolute material power as being subordinated to Wyclif 's more material, political opinions. Given the utility of Aristotelian methods in resolving problems that Wyclif claims to have bedeviled him in his youth, and given Wyclif 's occasional admission of the utility of these methods, Wilks finds it reasonable to assume that a kind of Thomistic compromise concerning a host of philosophical issues germinated in Wyclif 's mind, along with which came monarchist sympathies, like a stow-away. 53 Wilks' argument relied heavily on the assumption that only an Aristotelian, and an Ockhamist at that, could argue as fervently as Wyclif does in favor of secular monarchy. Wilks did not entertain the possibility that Gewirth was right to deny a causative connection between ontological nominalism and monarchism, leaving him free to argue what he recognized to be a difficult position, given the lack of evidence for ontological nominalism in Wyclif 's dominium treatises.
54
In "Wyclif and the Great Persecution," Wilks explored the possibilities that Wyclif 's theology is genuine, that his political theory is an outgrowth of his theological conclusions, and that his metaphysics is not nominalist. Here he argued that Wyclif 's most important thought came directly after the dominium treatises, particularly De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae. In these works, Wilks suggests, Wyclif 's debt to chiliastic Joachimite theology translates into a reformative vision in which no mortal power is able Wilks' approach changed with the edition and publication of the Tractatus de Universalibus in 1985. In his 1994 entry on Wyclif in the Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, he placed a much greater emphasis on Wyclif 's debt to Aristotelian reasoning than most scholars have recognized heretofore. He explained that Wyclif 's guiding philosophical principle was recognition of the importance of striking an Aristotelian mean between truly Platonic realism and excessive materialism.
56 This principle, Wilks continued, is first expressed in Wyclif 's earliest writing, namely in his Commentaries on the Physics (c. 1366). Wilks envisaged this playing out in Wyclif 's rejection of God's perfect knowledge being deterministic in De Dominio Divino, and in his call in De Civili Dominio and in De Officio Regis for the civil and sacerdotal lords to be responsible for elements specific to their spheres of influence.
57
Several scholars have attempted to provide fuller pictures of Wyclif 's thought on the correct ordering of postlapsarian human society. The fullest published attempt has been L. J. Daly's The Political Theory of John Wyclif , although its utility is decreased by Daly's tendency to miss the forest for the trees.
58 That is, Daly has carefully described the main points of the practical aspects of De Civili Dominio and De Officio Regis, paying attention to the conventional subjects of medieval monarchic theory, such as the two swords argument, the relation of king to law, hereditary succession, and so forth, all the while overlooking the fundamental theological purpose of these two works.
59 Most notable is Daly's relative inattention to the concept of dominium as a relation between God and Creation, and between men. He begins his discussion with the cursory definition of dominium of De Dominio Divino, I, i, which is not Wyclif 's formal definition, but a working version which he used to elucidate the relation in much greater detail in the rest of the work.
60 Absent is reference to the thirteen acts of dominium to which Wyclif refers at the beginning of the third book, from which we can understand the first two books of De Dominio Divino as having covered the first three acts (gubernacio, sustentare, creare), and the third book as elucidating the second three (donare, accipere, prestare). 61 These acts correspond to Wyclif 's description of human dominium in De Civili Dominio. Daly acknowledges that divine dominium is indeed something different from that enjoyed by humans, but he passes over the richly developed ties between private ownership and dominium that Wyclif uses to show this difference with the briefest glance at its importance.
62 Instead, dominium is described in almost exclusively jurisdictional terms, as a political relation allowing one 57 Ibid., p. 1507: "Les réalistes voudraient faire que toute chose soit fondamentalement divine, en déniant la rationalité au monde naturel; les ockhamistes voudraient renier la Bible en accordant l'existence aux seulsêtres matériels, si bien que la matière elle-même serait un principeéternel; mais les uns et les autres doiventêtre condamnés et corrigés." 58 See n. 28, above. 59 The best place to get a cursory understanding of this fundamental theological purpose is in W. R. 61 DD, III, i, 199.4-14. 62 Daly, The Political Theory, pp. 67-8: "Hence it is that God is not lord through a regiment of hierarchically subservient vassals, but he governs immediately and directly sustains and holds all that he has. His rule therefore is not like that of other kings. . . . When one speaks of human lordship, then, it is really only a stewardship held from the supreme Lord; for no creature serves another except insofar as he serves his God."
person to exercise social authority over another. Daly makes no reference to the Poverty Controversy, and pays little attention to the extensive analysis of private ownership Wyclif presents in Book III of De Civili Dominio, save to recognize Wyclif 's desire to divest the Roman church of its private property. In short, Daly focuses almost exclusively on the iurisdictio in Wyclif 's dominium, viewing proprietas as a topic only accidentally related to the concept. This deficiency is most evident when Daly discusses the later chapters of De Officio Regis. In his relation of Wyclif 's portrait of the nature of monarchy, he maneuvers around the lengthy discussions of the primary royal duty of ecclesiastical reform, touching on the more conventional political topics of protection of material goods, the relation of the king to law, and the place of clerics in royal service. He refers not at all to the summary Wyclif gradually gives of the primary royal duties towards the end of the work, which include regulation of the episcopal council, of the appointment of priests, and the fostering of theological doctors, which list strays far from the conventional boundaries of monarchical theory. 63 Why did Wyclif end the one work in which he had set out to describe the mechanics of civil rule with a prolonged argument about the royal responsibilities to guiding the clergy? Not only does Daly not approach this question, one would not imagine that such a question might arise, given his discussion. 64 Daly does recognize the importance of examining the thought of Giles of Rome, Ockham, and Fitzralph, and refutes the standing accusations that Wyclif had done little more than crib from De Pauperie Salvatoris. 65 Further, he argues against the idea that Wyclif 's pen was guided primarily by his association with John of Gaunt, which argument has been fostered by K. B. McFarlane in John Wycliffe and the Beginnings of English Nonconformity. 66 Edith Comfort Tatnall's 1964 doctoral thesis "Church and State According to John Wyclif" strives to show the place of Wyclif 's doctrine of political and ecclesiastical reform in light of his theology, and so exceeds the scope of Daly's work. Tatnall's thesis is comprehensive, including historical consideration of the problem of church-state relations in England through the fourteenth century, consideration of formative influences on Wyclif 's theory of human dominium, and a careful exposition of the proper motives and methods of a just civil lord. Her special strength is in showing how Wyclif 's social thought is firmly based in Augustine's, and she has appended a useful collection of especially relevant selections from De Civitate Dei to that end. She is generous in her attention to other influences, including canon law and Aristotelian political theory, but devotes little attention to the development of the concept of dominium in the thought of Wyclif 's more immediate predecessors. She examines the connection of civil to divine dominium, and the connections between De Dominio Divino and De Civili Dominio at the outset of her discussion of the nature of civil dominium. Although brief, this section points to the causal force that divine dominium has on all instances of created dominium, and refers to Wyclif 's idea that it serves as a standard or measure for all lesser instances. Tatnall's aim is not to explicate dominium as such, so she devotes relatively little space to divine dominium outside of the direct bearing it has on civil dominium. As a result, she only makes note of the possibility of a universal-particular relationship holding between divine and civil dominium.
67 Perhaps Tatnall's only weak point is her failure to explore the ties linking the development of the concept of proprietas during the Poverty Controversy to Wyclif 's political thought. One would think that every theorist of dominium would devote half of his space to an examination of private ownership, and the other half to secular jurisdictive concerns. This is not at all the way things were; for many political theorists of an Aristotelian bent, dominium was primarily a concept referring to ownership, and not immediately conceived to be synonymous with civil jurisdictional authority.
68 John of Paris, for instance, whose political theory has much in common with Wyclif regarding ideal end-results, views dominium as something wholly unrelated to iurisdictio. 71 Farr's argument is that Wyclif 's programmatic attempt to strengthen the royal position was well founded in an understanding of contemporary legal precedent, and that he used these precedents to implement his theological ends to improve their utility without perverting their original purpose. Unfortunately, Wyclif 's approach was hampered by a too-complete reliance on the contemporary; Farr suggests that Wyclif 's transvaluation of legal structure to accomplish his reformative ends lent itself too easily to becoming outdated by the evolution of English law.
72 This meant that when reform did come to England, Wyclif 's program was of no real use through its having become badly outdated, although Wyclif 's means, using secular law to effect ecclesiastical reform, had become an established principle.
In his influential Heresy in the Later Middle Ages, Gordon Leff has argued strenuously that the doctrine of Grace-founded dominium is little more than a red-herring in Wyclif 's works.
73 Leff argues that Wyclif believed every priest to have been ineligible for civil jurisdiction on biblical and metaphysical grounds, with Grace-founded dominium being but a decorative appendage. He explains that Wyclif did little more than recapitulate Fitzralph and Giles of Rome in his articulation of Grace-founded dominium in the first section of Book I of De Civili Dominio, and, having dispensed with theory, turned to more pressing matters.
74 Rather than direct his attention to Fitzralph's interest in private ownership, Wyclif is held to have conceived of dominium as primarily connected with the justice involved with civil jurisdiction. Leff believes that Wyclif reduced the power of Fitzralph's contention that Grace alone makes for true, divinely sanctioned human dominium by making God's justice the means by which human dominium is sanctioned.
75 This is a curious argument, for it is unclear whether Leff means that Wyclif has shifted the justifying element from Grace to divine justice, or whether he is contending that Wyclif wrongly conflates the two. Leff 's claim that Wyclif 's emphasis on 71 Ibid., p. 22. 72 Ibid., pp. 172-3. 73 Leff refers to De Domnio Divino as "an early work, which has little relevance to Wyclif 's subsequent ecclesiological thinking"; Gordon Leff, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages, vol.2, p. 521, n. 3. 74 Ibid., p. 547: "Where Giles had emphasized the dependence of all laymen -kings includedupon the church Fitzralph developed this equation of justice with authority to make dominion exclusively from God. It was a gift which in turn pre-supposed the gift of justice and grace. Only if a man was first justified by God with grace would he rule on God's behalf. Accordingly there could be no dominion without grace as its formal cause; and conversely mortal sin in destroying grace destroyed dominion. These two propositions together with their elaboration said everything which Wyclif was to say and said it more cogently." No distinction is made between natural, evangelical, or civil dominium here, nor does Leff discuss divine dominium as having a bearing on the issue. 75 Ibid., p. 548. the civil lord's need to make human law consistent with divine law in order to govern with true iustitia excludes Grace as a factor in the civil lord's dominium. But Wyclif stipulates that such consistency is only possible for the Grace-favored. True human justice is an effect of Grace; it is not a substitution for it.
Leff 's criticism of Wyclif has two approaches, first, that people cannot know who has been saved and who has been damned, and second, that Wyclif as good as exempted secular rulers from his Grace-founded dominium theory. Leff suggests that because Wyclif believes the subjugation of the just to tyrannous rule can be a tool whereby God castigates or instructs, he must be arguing that God sanctions tyranny, thus nullifying the Grace-founded dominium doctrine. Wyclif recognized that he could be interpreted in this way, and his arguments against the equation of Grace-founded just human dominium with God's use of unjust human dominium as a means to divine ends are clear.
76 Leff says in effect that Wyclif was unable to account for any sort of difference between the justice of Solomon's rule, a case of a just individual with temporal power, and the justice that develops out of Nebuchadnezzar's rule, where the just individual lacks temporal power.
Leff works, he holds that only the Elect can hold just dominium, implying that those who exercise dominium are among the Damned. Leff devotes considerable space to showing why this doctrine was so unsettling theologically, and refers later to it as a good reason why Wyclif probably was not serious about Grace and just dominium. Wyclif 's realism made it impossible to deny that God knows all potential instantiations of every universal before the instantiations were actualized. Thus, God knows eternally who will be among the Elect, so he could not escape the conclusion that God knows who comprise the true church. Had Wyclif not bothered to address the thorny issue of the relation of God's knowledge to created action, Leff 's criticisms would be understandable. But Wyclif 's earlier philosophical works feature a complex metaphysics of necessity and possibility, and a carefully constructed account of the relation of God's eternal knowing to created action. It is hard to avoid concluding that these treatises deserve attention in an account of Wyclif 's theory of just dominium. Leff admitted to having jumped the gun in accusing Wyclif of philosophical sloppiness in his "The Place of Metaphysics in Wyclif 's Theology," but fails to correct his misrepresentation of the place of Gracefounded dominium. He explains this shift in his view by referring to the recent appearance of the until then unedited Tractatus de Universalibus, and rightly recognizes the importance of this work in the corpus of Wyclif 's metaphysical works as the classical statement of his realism. But again, Leff holds that Wyclif 's doctrine that only the Elect can receive Grace means that nobody can recognize whether a civil lord is damned or not, which means that Wyclif somehow sacrificed the metaphysical consistency of his theory of Grace and dominium for political practicability in holding that the civil lord must be the ultimate temporal authority.
78
He argues here that Wyclif might have been serious about Grace and dominium when he began De Civili Dominio, but that as his program of ecclesiastical reform grew in importance in his mind, he sacrificed it in favor of royal absolutism in De Officio Regis.
Most notable is the extent to which other historians of medieval thought have followed Leff 's approach. dominium, thus defusing the Grace-dominium doctrine. 80 At least Lambert follows the later Leff in recognizing the force of the Grace-founded dominium idea in De Civili Dominio. The best that can be said of this dismissal of Grace-founded dominium from the essence of Wyclif 's social and political thought is that it shows how important Wyclif 's theology and metaphysics are to his political theory, for without it Wyclif sounds like a political hack sardonically employing theological justifications wherever the mood strikes him. The place of Wyclif 's realist metaphysics and his Augustinian reformative theology in De Civili Dominio and De Officio Regis will become increasingly evident as we explore his characterization of dominium as a portmanteau concept including proprietas and iurisdictio.
In his recent survey of Wyclif and Wycliffism at Oxford in the late fourteenth century J. I. Catto has argued that Wyclif 's metaphysical realism was importantly directive of his thought on dominium. 81 Like S. H. Thomson, Catto suggests that Wyclif 's argument that universals have a reality superior to their physical instantiations sparked an interest in theological issues like the nature of the Trinity, interpretation of Scripture, and the Incarnation. Catto notes that Wyclif 's first discussion of dominium appears in De Composicione Hominis (1372), a treatise on the relation of form and matter in the Incarnation, suggesting that the vigorous counter-arguments Wyclif encountered from William Woodford and others in response to this treatise planted the seed that germinated in the dominium treatises. 82 Most importantly, Catto recognizes Wyclif 's belief that created dominium has God's dominium as its exemplar, its universal, although he does not refer to the explicit articulation of this principle in Chapter 10 of De Universalibus. 83 The connection perceived by Thomson and Catto will direct our examination of the De Universalibus and its connection to the first books of the Summa Theologie.
